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I. INTRODUCTION
Private military company personnel almost equaled United States troops
in Afghanistan as of March 2011.1 In Iraq, where combat operation ended in
August 20 10,2 the number of private contractors exceeded the number of
American troops by nearly 20,000. 3 The increased use of private military
corporations (PMCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted the United
Kingdom's Foreign Office to evaluate options for regulating these
companies.4  Although the United Kingdom ended its Iraqi combat
operations in April 2009, 5 its continued use of private military companies in
Afghanistan has placed increased pressure on the British government to pass
legislation regulating these firms.6 British firms remain involved in the war
in Iraq through contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), even
after the termination of its combat operations.7
The role of U.S. military contractors in Iraq has become increasingly
controversial, especially after the September 2007 Nisour Square shootings
where seventeen Iraqi civilians died after Blackwater 8 guards, who were
escorting a State Department convoy in Baghdad, opened fire on a car as it
rolled toward them.9 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted five
There were 99,800 troops and 90,339 contractors in Afghanistan. MOSHE SCHWARTZ &
JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 6 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.
pdf.
2 Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Declares an End to Combat Mission in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/o1/world/Olmilitary.htm.
There were 45,660 troops and 64,253 contractors in Iraq. SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra
note 1, at 6.
4 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR
REGULATION, H.C. 577 (2002) [hereinafter PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES GREEN PAPER],
available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hcOI02/hc05/0577/0577.pdf.
5 U.K. Combat Operations End in Iraq, BBC (Apr. 30, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8
026136.stm.
6 Richard Norton-Taylor, Milband Urged to Regulate Private Military, GUARDIAN (Feb.
18, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/18/military. foreignpolicyl.
Marcin Terlikowski, Private Military Companies in the US Stabilization ofIraq 44 (Polish
Inst. of Int'l Affairs, Research Paper No. 9, 2008), available at http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik
=3113. The most notable of these contracts is the approximately half-billion-dollar Aegis DOD
contract to help reconstruct Iraq. Id.
8 Blackwater is currently known as Xe Services, LLC. Top Secret America: A
Washington Post Investigation, Xe Services LLC, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpos
t.com/top-secret-america/companies/xe-services-llc/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
9 James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/world/mid
dleast/03firefight.html?pagewanted=all.
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Blackwater guards for their involvement in the shooting.'0 The events of that
day are disputed:
The Blackwater guards said they believed that they had come
under small-arms fire from insurgents when they began firing
machine guns, grenade launchers and a sniper rifle in Nisour
Square, a busy Baghdad traffic intersection. But investigators
concluded that the guards, who were escorting American
diplomats, had indiscriminately fired in an unprovoked and
unjustified assault."
Contractors have also been sued for alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.
2
British security contractors have made headlines as well, 13 although no
British contractor has attracted as much attention and controversy as the
American firm, Blackwater.
With President Obama's new focus on Afghanistan 14 and the continued
support from the British government-at least in the short term15-both
countries have continued to rely heavily on private contractors to support the
war effort. 2010 saw the addition of roughly 27,000 U.S. troops and 54,000
U.S. contractors in Afghanistan.
16
10 Ginger Thompson & James Risen, 5 Guards Face U.S. Charges in Iraq Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/06/washington/06
blackwater.html.
11 Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered As Blackwater Charges Are Dropped, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20l0/01/02/us/02blackwater.html.
12 Josh White, Judge Allows Abu Ghraib Lawsuit Against Contractor, WASH. POST (Nov. 7,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/1 1/06/AR2007 110602025.
html. Many Abu Ghraib detainees sued CACI intemational for their alleged participation in
prisoner abuse. Id.
13 See Margaret Davis, British Contractor Held over Iraq Deaths, INDEP. (Aug. 9, 2009),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/british-contractor-held-over-iraq-death-
1769937.html (declaring that a British contractor was suspected of murdering two of his fellow
contractors).
14 In a speech at West Point on December 1, 2009, President Obama pledged 30,000
additional troops to Afghanistan. Scott Wilson, Obama: U.S. Security Is Still at Stake, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti
cle/2009/12/0 1/AR2009120101231 .html?sub=AR.
15 James F. Smith, British Support of Afghanistan Fight Not Flagging, Ambassador Says,
Bos. GLOBE, July 31, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/artic
les/2009/07/3 1/british still support involvement in afghanistanambassador-says/; Helene
Mulholland, British Troops in Afghanistan to Increase to over 10,000: Gordon Brown
Announces Extra 500 Soldiers to Be Deployed Next Month, GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2009), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/nov/30/britain-500-troops-afghanistan. But see Svenja O'Donnell,
UK. Support for Afghan War Slips; Combat Deaths Rise (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8,
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=asUV4GnwiO 14&refer=
uk noting the decline in popular support at 21%).
MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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With this continued reliance on contractors comes growing confusion
about the legal status of these firms regarding both how they are licensed by
their home states, 17 and their accountability when they break laws abroad.
The determination of whether the laws of the United States and the United
Kingdom adequately address these concerns is crucial, because the use of
PMCs could fundamentally alter the way modem wars are fought. War may
become increasingly privatized, shifting the burden of conflict from the
servicemen and women of national militaries to private actors. Private
contractors offer increased efficiency in war-fighting as states are able to
purchase military services for less than the cost of providing the same
services themselves, but they also pose serious accountability challenges,
especially when the duties of their employees include the use of force.
Rather than regulating PMCs directly, the British government promotes
self regulation through an industry-wide voluntary code of conduct.18 The
U.S. government regulates military contractors under the Arms Export
Control Act 19 and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 20 a system
that has served as a model for regulation in the United Kingdom to some
British commentators.2'
This Note argues that strong licensing regulations, increased
accountability, and, most importantly, a clear limitation of military
contractors to services that do not require force, will provide a legal and
practical framework for controlling PMCs. In the short run, the United
Kingdom should abandon its voluntary code of conduct for the more robust
American PMC regulatory model, with the common aim that all PMCs
should be licensed when they operate outside of their home states. But in the
long run, regulations alone are insufficient to control PMCs. To better
prevent another Nisour Square, both countries should limit the use of PMCs
to operations that do not involve engagement with nations hostile to their
home states and should leave fighting to the national militaries. These
policies would ensure that states preserve their monopoly over the use of
force and avoid the grave accountability issues attendant to its use.
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 5 (2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/document
s/organization/145569.pdf.
17 For the purpose of this argument, "home state" refers to the state in which the PMC is
based.
18 Richard Norton-Taylor, Foreign Office to Propose Self-Regulation for Private Military
Firms, GUARDIAN, (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/24/private-mili
tary-firms-govemment.
20 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799 (2011).
20 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2011).
Clive Walker & Dave Whyte, Contracting out War? Private Military Companies, Law
and Regulation in the United Kingdom, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 651, 667-68 (2005).
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Part II of this Note traces the general historical shift from mercenary
forces to PMCs and the expansion of private military services in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Part III examines the laws and regulatory schemes in the
United States and the United Kingdom, illustrating how events in Iraq and
Afghanistan have exposed both the inadequacies of current laws and the need
for greater regulation. Part IV argues that the American approach to
regulation should serve as a model for the United Kingdom, while discussing
how the regulatory scheme may be improved through limitations on the use
of PMCs based on the types of services provided and the relationship
between the home state and the state utilizing the PMC services.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Distinguishing PMCs from Mercenaries
The term "private military company" remains ambiguous and is often
used interchangeably with terms like "private security firm" and "private
military contractor." For the purposes of this Note, PMCs are broadly
defined as "legally established multinational commercial enterprises offering
services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic way and
by military means and/or the transfer or enhancement of that potential to
clients. 22 This definition encompasses a wide range of activities from direct
participation in conflict to support and logistical services, such as providing
meals and equipment. 23 The shared element across all of these military
services is that they "have a direct impact on and contribute to the
management of the state's monopoly of legitimate violence., 24 This Note
will refer to PMC employees as "contractors."
A contractor is distinguishable from a mercenary. A mercenary may be
defined loosely as "one who accepts money or some benefit for military
service., 25 Although some commentators who are critical of PMCs have
referred to them as mercenary organizations, PMCs should not be considered
mercenaries within the meaning of international law. Not only does an
unfavorable stigma surround mercenaries, but PMCs also do not fit within
22 Carlos Ortiz, The Private Military Company: An Entity at the Center of Overlapping
Spheres of Commercial Activity and Responsibility, in PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIEs 55, 60 (Thomas Jager & Gerhard Ktimmel eds., 2007).
23 Because this Note uses such a broad definition of PMCs, it differentiates between PMC
services when needed, and makes different recommendations based upon the type of service.
24 Ortiz, supra note 22, at 61.
25 Michael Scheimer, Separating Private Military Companies from Illegal Mercenaries in
International Law: Proposing an International Convention for Legitimate Military and
Security Support That Reflects Customary International Law, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 609,
615 (2009).
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the international law definition of "mercenary," as defined within Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions,26 the U.N. Convention on the Law of
Mercenaries,27 or customary international law.28  The definition of
"mercenary" in these conventions reflect Cold War political attempts to
outlaw mercenary activity under international law by post-colonial African
states, which were often harmed by mercenary activity.29 Although some
PMC activity could arguably fall within the above broad definition of
"mercenary" in the sense that PMCs accept payment for military services,
mercenaries generally do not enjoy legal recognition in the Western world
and are often associated with criminal activity, whereas PMCs legally
provide military services with the consent or authorization of a State.
B. Rise of the Private Military
The use of mercenary forces is older than the modern state system and a
standing national army.30 Even after the rise of national armies and the
acceptance of the state's monopoly on the use of force, states continued "to
supplement national standing armies with hired support.' Some
commentators have pointed out that the rise of national armies in the
nineteenth century reduced the need for private military services because
strong states did not need private militaries and, in fact, were threatened by
these groups.32
26 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm. See Michael Scheimer,
supra note 25, at 623-24 (noting that, because the Geneva Conventions definitions are
cumulative, PMCs can easily avoid being classified as mercenaries by avoiding a single
provision of the Geneva Conventions' definitions).
27 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc.
A/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) (entered into force Oct. 20, 2001), available at http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/law/mercenaries.htm.
Y8 Scheimer, supra note 25, at 637. State practice shows an acceptance for the use of
private military companies, as distinguished from mercenaries. Id.
29 Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate
Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2003).
30 Id. at 2-3.
31 Scheimer, supra note 25, at 615.
32 See Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict
and Its Implications, 32 PARAMETERS 104, 107-08 (2002), available at http://www.carlisle.ar
my.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/02winter/smith.pdf (explaining the historical shift that
led to the state monopolization on the use of violence).
The growth of bureaucratically mature states capable of organizing violence
created increasingly strong competition for private military corporations. At
the same time, states began to recognize that their inability to control the
actions of these private organizations challenged state sovereignty and
[Vol. 39:445
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The modem rise of PMCs coincided with the end of the Cold War and the
resulting "surplus of highly trained, professional soldiers in search of
employment opportunities. 33 As unemployed professional soldiers flooded
the market, the collapse of Cold War alliances created an instability that led
to increased regional conflict and more failed states, which also created a
desirable opportunity for unemployed soldiers.34 A notable example of PMC
involvement in a major conflict before September 11, 2001, was the role of
the American PMC, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), in the
Balkans." Some commentators accredit the successful Croat assault on Serb
forces in 1995 to the MPRI.36 The actions of the MPRI in the Balkans serve
as an example of how a PMC's home state may tacitly support PMC action
abroad in order to advance its foreign policy objectives.37
There are three reasons a state might use a PMC to further its foreign
policy: first, "the state's armed forces could be overstretched"; second, "the
[PMC] could be in a position to provide the defense services more cost
effectively than the state's armed forces"; and finally, "the [PMC] may have
good contacts within the retaining/deploying government., 38 Although the
reasons for the proliferation of PMCs are more complex than the three
factors mentioned above, some combination of these factors likely explains
the increase in the use of PMCs by both the United States and the United
Kingdom in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This Note analyzes the regulation of PMCs by home states from two
perspectives: first, the actual regulation of PMCs in the form of licensing
schemes, codes of conduct, and other methods; and second, the extent to
which these regulations actually influence the behavior of PMCs and provide
for accountability of the PMC to the home state. PMC regulation and
licensing are distinct from PMC accountability. A home state may choose to
regulate market entry by requiring a PMC to register with the state in order
to obtain a license or some other form of state recognition, but this does not
necessarily mean that the home state holds the PMC accountable for its
actions abroad. Accountability depends on the reach of the home state's
legitimacy. The result was that the utility of the private military corporation
as a tool of state warfare disappeared ... until recently.
Id.
33 Milliard, supra note 29, at 11.
34 Smith, supra note 32, at 108.
35 Milliard, supra note 29, at 14.
36 Id.
37 See Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and States: Actors,
Interactions, and Reactions, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 67, 92-93 (2006) (arguing that the U.S. State
Department issued licenses to MPRI to train the Croatian army as a means to further U.S.
foreign policy objectives in the region without violating the United Nations ban on providing
military assistance to either Serbia or Croatia).
38 Id. at 88.
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domestic laws. Alternatively, the laws of the host state where PMCs operate
could hold PMCs accountable. However, as a practical matter, immunity
arrangements often interfere with enforcement. In short, this Note addresses
both the regulations themselves and their effectiveness.
C. U.S. Licensing
The level of scrutiny that a PMC will face in the United States depends
primarily on whether it is working for a foreign government or for the United
States. The State Department issues licenses for PMCs providing military
services to foreign states. 39  However, because many PMCs in Iraq and
Afghanistan contract directly with a U.S. agency,4" the contract between the
U.S. agency and the PMC becomes the primary means of regulation because
the licensing scheme does not apply. A clear way to discipline a PMC is to
terminate its contract with the agency, as the State Department did with
Blackwater's contract to protect U.S. diplomats in January 2009.4 1 The host
state may also keep a PMC from operating by refusing to contract with
certain firms.
D. U.S. Accountability
Even when PMCs are required to obtain a license from the State
Department in order to work for a foreign government, contractors might not
be held accountable for their actions abroad.42 Contractors who commit
39 See Walker & Whyte, supra note 21, at 667 (discussing the State Department's approval
and registration process).
The Arms Export Control Act 1968 and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) require State Department approval for the sale of
military equipment and related services (including training) between US
companies and foreign States. Manufacturers and providers of defence goods
or services for export must register with the Office of Defense Trade Controls
in the Department of State, from whom must be sought a license. Any letter
of offer to sell defence articles or services for $50m or more, any design and
construction services for $200m or more, or any major defence equipment for
$14m or more must be notified by the State Department to Congress ....
Id. (citations omitted).
40 State Department Awarding Private Contractors Up to $10 Billion to Safeguard
Embassies, CBS NEWS (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20018795
-503544.html [hereinafter State Department Awarding Private Contractors].
41 Anthony Boadle, U.S. Will Not Renew Blackwater Contract in Iraq, REUTERS (Jan. 31,
2009), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE50T73520090131; see discussion infra Part III.B.2
(discussing the contractual method of regulation).
42 See Walker & Whyte, supra note 21, at 669 (noting the "meagre extent to which the US
regulatory system guards against the commission of unlawful killings of combatants, or
indeed is able to protect US civilians employed by PMCs").
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crimes abroad face possible prosecution under two different U.S. laws. First,
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),43 a contractor
could be prosecuted if working for the DOD or for "any other Federal
agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates
to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas." 44 Second,
a PMC employee could theoretically face prosecution under Article 2 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 45 which Congress amended in
2007 to allow for greater flexibility in prosecuting contractors, even without
46
an official declaration of war. Both of these options for prosecution pose
unique challenges, which will be addressed below. 47 In addition to United
States domestic law, a new agreement between Iraq and the United States
terminated PMC immunity from Iraqi law, opening the possibility of
48prosecution by Iraqi authorities.
E. British Regulations
The United Kingdom does not have a PMC licensing system comparable
to the U.S. State Department system. Although the British government
considered various regulatory options in a 2002 Green Paper49 and received
continuous domestic pressure to regulate PMCs.50 British PMCs seeking to
provide services face little governmental oversight. The British
government's preferred method for dealing with PMCs-as expressed in an
April 24, 2009 statement from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office-
involves three components: first, developing a code of conduct for PMCs;
second, committing to contract only with firms that meet this standard of
43 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2006); see also id.
§ 3261 (a) (declaring that employees of the armed forces, certain members of the armed forces,
and those accompanying the armed forces may be prosecuted in federal court for actions
abroad that would constitute an offense punishable in the United States by more than one
year's confinement).
Id. § 3267(l)(A).
45 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2009); see id. § 802(a)(10)
(extending UCMJ jurisdiction to "persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field" during a "declared war or a contingency operation").
46 Jeffrey S. Thumher, Drowning in Blackwater: How Weak Accountability over Private
Security Contractors Significantly Undermines Counterinsurgency Efforts, 2008 ARMY LAW.
64, 77 (2008) (extending coverage to" 'contingency operations' ").
47 See discussion infra Part. III.A (stating the problem with the U.S. scheme).
49 James Risen, End of Immunity Worries US. Contractors in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2008, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/world/middleeast/0 1 contract
ors.html.
49 PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES GREEN PAPER, supra note 4, at 22-26.50 Norton-Taylor, supra note 18.
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conduct; and finally, working internationally to develop global standards
regulating PMCs.
5 1
In the absence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, existing British
law does little to restrain the actions of PMCs. The 2002 Green Paper
frankly admitted the problems with accountability that would be created if
the government adopted a self-regulatory approach.52 The Export Control
Act 200253 contains technical assistance restrictions that are "potentially
usable against PMCs to prevent trafficking and brokering in military
equipment ... ,54 The Landmines Act 55 might also apply to PMCs if they
provide land-mine related services.56 Although these acts may apply
tangentially to British PMCs, they are not designed primarily to deal with
PMCs, and will probably not be used to regulate PMC activity in the future.57
Because of the British preference for PMC self-regulation,58 the legislation
that governs British military operations includes anachronistic acts such as
the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870. 59
F. British Accountability
British authorities have not yet faced a situation in which they have
needed to prosecute British PMC employees for actions committed abroad,
as has the United States with Blackwater. Nevertheless, the risk still exists
that one of Britain's PMCs, acting under a U.S. contract, may commit a
crime in Iraq and expose both the United Kingdom and the United States to
scrutiny. This is exactly what- happened to contractor Danny Fitzsimons,
who was sentenced to life in prison by an Iraqi court in February 2011, for
51 FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, CONSULTATION ON PROMOTING HIGH STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT BY PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES (PMSCs) INTERNATIONALLY 9-
10 (2009) [hereinafter CONSULTATION], available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/
4103709/5476465/5550005/pmsc-public-consultation.
52 See PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES GREEN PAPER, supra note 4, at 26 ("[Self-regulation]
would not meet one of the main objectives of regulation, namely to avoid a situation where
companies might damage British interests. The lack of legal backing would mean that the
Government might be compelled to watch while a company pursued a course that was plainly
contrary to the public interest.").
53 Export Control Act, 2002, c. 28 (Eng.).
54 Walker & Whyte, supra note 21, at 657.
55 Landmines Act, 1998, (Eng.).
56 But see Walker & Whyte supra note 21, at 657 (noting that, despite the language of the
Landmines Act 1998, which would likely cover PMC activities, Dyncorp Aerospace Ltd., a
British PMC, was not prosecuted for its work with the United States government involving
storing mine scattering devices).
57 See id. (noting that "[b]eyond the Export Control Act, PMCs are not the targets... of
le§slation").
8Norton-Taylor, supra note 18.
59 Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90 (Eng.).
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shooting two of his fellow contractors and an Iraqi guard.60 By allowing
Iraqi authorities to prosecute a British PMC contractor, the British
government has effectively announced a policy that British PMCs are
responsible for their own people. This responsibility includes the now real
possibility that their employees may be subject to prosecution by foreign
governments.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statement of Problem
Based on the foregoing discussion, each country's legal framework for
controlling PMCs has serious deficiencies. The U.S. system offers increased
oversight of government accountability through licensing, but this system
does not apply to the large number of PMC personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan who contract directly with the United States. Further, federal
prosecutors have used the MEJA to prosecute contractors for their actions
abroad, but its effectiveness and efficiency remain untested and are likely to
pose problems. 61 Finally, the expiration of contractor immunity to Iraqi law
may expose civilians in the United States to judicial process in countries
where a fair trial may not be possible.
To the extent that the British use of PMCs is limited by the small size of
its forces in Afghanistan, 62 accountability problems are not as likely to occur
as they are in the United States. However, industry self-regulation poses
unique challenges. Although self-regulation provides British businesses with
a great degree of flexibility, it gives the government almost no accountability
over PMC actions abroad. Self-regulation also exposes PMCs to prosecution
abroad and leaves open the possibility that PMC personnel will not be
punished at all if the host state does not press charges. Thus, the
accountability gap is even more acute than in the United States and could
cause serious problems should another Nisour Square arise involving a
British PMC.
60 Jane Arraf, British Security Contractor Danny Fitzsimons Gets Life in Prison for Murder in
Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 28, 2001), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/
2011/0228/British-security-contractor-Danny-Fitzsimons-gets-life-in-prison-for-murder-in-Iraq.
61 Del Quentin Wilber & Karen DeYoung, Justice Dept. Moves Toward Charges Against
Contractors in Iraq Shooting, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR2008081601967.html.
62 Currently, there are roughly 9,500 British forces deployed in Afghanistan. Operations in
Afghanistan: British Forces, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, http://www.mod.uk/Defencelnternet/
FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationslnAfghanistanBritishForces.htm (last visited Mar.
20, 2011).
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B. United States Options
The United States' options for regulation can be divided into two broad
categories: first, expanding or modifying existing regulations such as the
licensing system and the contracts that govern PMCs or the laws that allow
prosecution of PMC personnel, and, second, creating new regulations
limiting PMC roles in combat operations or integrating PMCs within the
command structure. These two categories are not exclusive or exhaustive,
but they are broadly representative of a variety of approaches to PMC
regulation.
1. Licensing
Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act 63 and the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, 64 the U.S. State Department issues licenses for PMCs
contracting with foreign states.65 While these laws allow the United States to
have some degree of control over PMC activity abroad, Congress is unaware
of many contracts since these laws do not require the executive branch to
notify Congress if the contract is less than $50 million.66 Even with strong
licensing law and regulations, U.S.-based PMCs seeking to do business
abroad may simply move to another country with less restrictive licensing
schemes, in order to avoid U.S. regulations.67 An international regulatory
scheme may be one way to avoid PMCs moving to avoid regulation,68 but the
international regulation of PMCs poses a host of problems, such as the
creation of a new international body that requires state recognition and its
69
own jurisdiction.
2. Contract
Some writers have seized upon contracts as the most effective and natural
way of regulating PMCs. 70 The thrust of these arguments is that the market
63 ms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799 (2011).
64 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2011).
65 Walker & Whyte, supra note 21, at 667.
66 Arms Export Control Act § 2776(c)(1).
67 See Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal for a Layered
Approach to Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 825, 855 (2005)
(noting that absent international regulation, PMCs can move their base of operations to a less
restrictive country when their home country enacts unacceptable regulations).
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.D (discussing PMC relocation tactics to avoid
accountability).
70 See Desai, supra note 67, at 858-59 (arguing that the United States could draft contracts
that would ensure PMC accountability in U.S. courts and require PMC personnel to undergo
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power of the governments that utilize PMC services is great enough to
contractually bind PMCs to minimum standards of home-state accountability
and human rights.71
The basic problem with contractual, market-based regulation of PMCs is
that such regulation is effective only to the extent that the contracting state
has the ability to monitor and enforce the contracts.72 In an operation as
large as the Iraq War, monitoring all of the contracts can be extremely
difficult and costly. Increasing reliance on contractual controls could have
an effect contrary to the proponents' intent, by increasing government
reliance on PMCs and thereby reducing governmental expertise in the areas
required to effectively monitor PMC activities.73
3. Current Laws
PMC personnel are most likely to be prosecuted under either the MEJA
74
or possibly Article 2 of the UCMJ. 75 The main problem with the MEJA is
that it probably does not cover all of the types of PMCs operating in Iraq. As
currently written, the MEJA allows for the prosecution of civilian contractors
when their employment relates to supporting the mission of the DOD.76
Because many of the contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan work for non-DOD
agencies, such as the State Department,77 the MEJA arguably does not apply
to them, depending on how broadly the language of the MEJA is interpreted.
In response to this loophole, the House of Representatives passed a bill in
October 2007 that would expand the MEJA to all PMC personnel operating
in Iraq, regardless of agency.78 Despite the ambiguity of the language about
supporting the mission of the DOD, the DOJ indicted the Blackwater
employees involved in the Nisour Square shooting, the first prosecution of
training in human rights).
71 Elke Krahmann, Security Governance and the Private Military Industry in Europe and
North America, 5 CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 247, 263 (2005) ("[C]ontracts between government
and private military firms can overcome the problem of private firms evading national
controls because companies are under direct contractual obligation to the government for
which they are operating - whether nationally or abroad.").
72 See id. at 263-64 (stating that contracts can only address normative concerns such as
transparency).
73 Id. at 264.
74 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act § 3261.
75 See Uniform Code of Military Justice § 802(a)(10) (stating that persons, such as PMC
personnel, serving with the armed forces during a war or contingency operation are subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
76 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act § 3267(l)(A).
77 State Department Awarding Private Contractors, supra note 40.
78 House Passes Bill that Would Hike Penalties for U.S. Security Contractors in Iraq,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,299370,00.html.
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non-DOD private contractors under the expanded MEJA. 79 The trial was set
for January 2010,80 but the charges were dropped in early 2010 because the
prosecution improperly used statements given by the Blackwater guards,81 so
the applicability and scope of the MEJA will remain unclear for the
immediate future. General Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of U.S.
forces in Iraq at the time, described the result as a " 'lesson in the rule of
law,' ,82 but Iraqis reacted strongly to the news that the charges had been
dropped:
"What are we - not human?" asked Abdul Wahab Adul
Khader, a 34-year-old bank employee and one of at least 20
people wounded in the melee. "Why do they have the right to
kill people? Is our blood so cheap? For America, the land of
justice and law, what does it mean to let criminals go? 83
Because the shootings occurred when contractors were immune from
Iraqi laws, the Blackwater guards cannot be prosecuted in Iraq, although the
Iraqi government announced that it is considering suing Blackwater for civil
damages.
84
The UCMJ modification arguably has the same problems as the MEJA in
that it does not extend to PMCs that support non-DOD agencies. 85 In
addition to its incomplete coverage, the UCMJ amendments may not be
constitutional based upon Supreme Court precedent in Reid v. Covert and
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo.86 Although the argument for
UMCJ jurisdiction is likely stronger for PMC personnel because of the
79 Five Blackwater Employees Indicted on Manslaughter and Weapons Charges for Fatal
Nisur Square Shooting in Iraq, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/December/08-nsd- 1068.html.
80 James Vicini, Judge Sets Trial in 2010for Blackwater Guards, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2009),
htp://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/06/us-usa-iraq-blackwater-idUSTRE5056VU20090106.
1 Williams, supra note 11.
82 Id. (Odierno added," 'Of course people are not going to like it because they believe these
individuals conducted some violence and should be punished for it .... But the bottom line is,
using the rule of law, the evidence obviously was not there, or was collected illegally.' ").
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act § 802(a)(10) (detailing that the Act extends
UCMJ jurisdiction to "persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field").
However, this would arguably not cover PMCs providing security for State Department
convoys, unless they are found to "serve with" or "accompany" an armed force.
86 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that application of UMCJ court martial
jurisdiction to civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas during times of
peace is not constitutional); see also McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S.
281 (1960) (holding that UCMJ court martial jurisdiction does not extend to civilian
employees of overseas military forces for non-capital offenses).
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Congressional authorization of the use of military force in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Congress still has not officially declared war,87 and any
prosecution under the UCMJ will have to get around the strong precedent of
Reid and Guagliardo.
One last option for accountability under U.S. law is derived from the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).88 It allows only civil actions filed by aliens for
violations of either customary international law or a United States treaty.89
The complexities of the ATS are beyond the scope of this discussion, but in
at least one case, the Supreme Court has been strict in its interpretation of the
language of the ATS and establishing a violation of either a U.S. treaty or
customary law can be difficult. 90 Despite these difficulties, the Center for
Constitutional Rights brought a claim against Blackwater under the ATS on
behalf of some of the families of Iraqis killed in Nisour Square.
91
4. Integration with Military Command Structure
Another option for regulating PMCs is to place them within the command
structure of the military. PMCs working for the DOD are already
substantially within the military chain of command, 92 but State Department
contractors are not. Some commentators argue that all PMCs, both DOD and
non-DOD, should be placed within the military chain of command to ensure
both that military orders are followed and that the PMCs can be disciplined.93
This approach might be ideal from a commander's perspective, but because
of the amount of interagency coordination required, it could be extremely
difficult to implement. This approach would also not solve the underlying
issue of accountability because being under a military chain of command
87 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res.
114, 107th Cong. (2002) (demonstrating that the United States authorized use of force but has
not yet declared war on Iraq); see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23,
107th Cong. (2001) (showing that the United States has not yet declared war on Afghanistan).
88 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.").
89 Id.
90 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (finding that petitioner failed to state
a claim under the ATS either as a violation of a U.S. treaty or a norm of customary
international law).
91 The case settled on January 6, 2010. Abtan, et at. v. Prince, eta., CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/abtan-et-al-v-blackwater-usa-et-al (last visited Mar. 20,
2011).
92 See Thumher, supra note 46, at 81 (discussing a September 2007 memorandum from
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon England, directing commanders to fully use their UCMJ
authority against PMC employees who violate the code).
93 Id. at 87 ("The most efficient system would be to instead place these armed [PMCs]
under the control of one authority, presumably the military.").
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does not necessarily mean that PMCs can be held accountable under the
UCMJ. Simply placing PMCs in the chain of command would not
automatically make them subject to the UCMJ.
5. Limitation to Non-Combat Operations
Finally, control over PMCs can be achieved by limiting contractors to
non-security services. A non-security limitation of PMC activity could
achieve many of the same results as other forms of regulation, but with a
more direct and immediate impact. However, even though limiting reliance
on PMCs may be the most effective way to avoid another Nisour Square, the
current level of reliance on PMCs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan might
make such limitations unrealistic or impractical.94
C. British Options
Because of the dearth of British statutes directly applicable to most PMC
activity,95 and the de facto adoption of a self-regulatory approach,96 most
PMC accountability under present law must come from within the industry
itself, or possibly under the auspices of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), or even from Iraqi courts. Self-regulation, the possibility of a
licensing regime, and the possibility of ICC jurisdiction are addressed in
turn.
1. Self-Regulation
Self-regulation has a couple of distinct advantages over other regulatory
options. It is the cheapest form of regulation available, costing the
government nothing beyond the initial costs of helping to draft a voluntary
code of conduct.97 The scheme has the added benefit of helping to create
standards within the PMC industry to distinguish between respectable and
disreputable companies.98
94 Id. at 90 ("Even though it seems an unlikely move given the current desire and
willingness of the administration to privatize such functions, the United States' abilities to win
counterinsurgencies would improve if it scaled back on its use of [PMCs].").
95 See Walker & Whyte, supra note 21, at 657 (citing little legislation to control PMCs
apart from the Export Control Act).
96 See CONSULTATION, supra note 51, at 9 (measuring effectiveness of self-regulation).
97 PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES GREEN PAPER, supra note 4, at 46 ("The costs of self-
regulation would fall entirely upon companies, since they would need to finance the industry
association to oversee the scheme.").
98 See id at 26 (noting that membership would provide assurance of respectability).
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The approach has several notable drawbacks as well. First, self-
regulation does not provide a mechanism for the British government to
monitor or control PMC activity abroad, which could result in a situation
where the government would be "compelled to watch while a company
pursued a course that was plainly contrary to the public interest." 99 Second,
the regulation would necessarily depend on the industry's ability and desire
to discipline itself.00 Even with a strong commitment by the industry to
enforce its own policies, determining what exactly PMCs are doing in remote
and often inaccessible regions around the world may be extremely difficult
or impossible.
2. Licensing
Although more complex than self-regulation, a licensing system has
several advantages. First, because the British government also licenses
military goods, "it seems logical that it should also license the export of
military services." Second, the licensing scheme of the United States has
performed well for two decades without major problems. Finally, a licensing
regime is more flexible than other options and gives the government "the
opportunity to consider the nature of the service in question and the political
and strategic background against which it took place." 101
On the other hand, licensing has drawbacks beyond cost, including
enforcement difficulties, delays for PMCs seeking to operate abroad, the
possibility of PMCs moving to other states to avoid regulations, and that
British PMCs might face a market disadvantage.'° 2
3. Limitation/Ban on PMC Services
A total ban on PMC military activity abroad is a possible solution to the
regulatory issues. The appeal of this approach is its simplicity and
effectiveness in preventing the types of abuses that regulation of the PMC
industry seeks to address. 10 3 If PMCs are not operating militarily abroad,
then there will be little risk of human rights violations or accountability gaps
because the services that PMCs provide, such as supplying food and shelter
for troops, do not place armed PMC employees in direct contact with
civilians.
99 Id.
1oo Id.
01 Id. at 24.
102 Id. at 24-25.
103 Id. at 22 ("This would be the most direct way of dealing with an activity that many find
objectionable. The legislations could apply either to all such activities or to a limited range,
for example direct participation in combat.").
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Yet this approach has a number of practical drawbacks such as preventing
weak states from gaining access to necessary military services and the
difficulty of drawing a clear line between military and non-military
services.104 Even services, such as construction, which seem non-military,
still require armed security to succeed, and thus have a military component.
D. International Options
Some commentators have argued that international regulation is needed
because of PMCs' ability to relocate in order to avoid accountability for their
actions.10 5 The main problem with international regulation of PMC activity
is the lack of political support in both the United States and the United
Kingdom,10 6 two states that rely heavily on PMCs. If the United States and
the United Kingdom did not participate, a treaty regulating PMC activity
would be politically unpopular, difficult to negotiate, and likely ineffective.
However, one nonbinding declaration has had some success in defining the
customary international law concerning PMCs, and has received support
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the PMC industry.10 7 The
likely political opposition to a PMC treaty in both the United States and
United Kingdom 0 8 makes international regulation an unrealistic and
impractical option at this point, although it may become more viable in the
future if the political attitudes change or if additional high profile PMC
abuses occur.
104 Id. at 23.
105 P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 544 (2004).
106 Id. ("[S]ome states, including the United States and the United Kingdom, clearly support
the industry, finding its activities to their advantage in many foreign policy activities. They are
unlikely to back such a program to ban [PMCs]. As a result of all of these factors, efforts at
legal prohibition appear to be a non-starter in the present context. Moreover, they would
likely only repeat the past failures of the anti-mercenary laws.").
107 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for
States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict,
transmitted by letter dated Oct. 2, 2008 from the Permanent Rep. of Switzerland to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Oct. 6, 2008)
[hereinafter Montreux Document], available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/download
s/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0057.File.tmp/Montreux%20Document/o20(e).pdf
108 See Desai, supra note 67, at 854 (predicting that "[t]he United States will either
categorically oppose the [proposed international regulatory] system or not consider joining
such a system until after it is fully laid out," and also noting the political opposition to
proposals to regulate British PMCs).
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E. Recommendations
The United States and the United Kingdom should modify their
regulatory systems to ensure that PMCs, when contracting with their home
state, 109 only provide services that are unlikely to require the use of force.
When a PMC contracts with a state other than its home state, this limitation
would not apply, and the PMC could supply services that are likely to
involve the use of force, subject to the limitations discussed below. This
recommendation reflects the reality that PMCs provide a broad range of
services with varying degrees of danger-from providing meals for troops to
armed security for State Department convoys-and seeks to limit PMC
involvement in home state war efforts to lower the potential for Nisour
Square-type incidents as much as possible. l 0 In the United States, this
recommendation could be accomplished by having the military provide all of
the armed security for the State Department and other executive agency
convoys, extending the reach of the MEJA to ensure that PMC personnel can
be held accountable when abuses occur, and continuing to use the ITAR to
license PMCs who provide military services for other nations. In the United
Kingdom, this recommendation could be accomplished in much the same
way as in the United States; however, the United Kingdom needs to create a
licensing system as well to ensure that the British PMC personnel are held
accountable for their actions abroad.
The trend of home states using PMC services in situations where the
state's military would traditionally possess a monopoly on the use of force is
unique,11 at least in recent history.11 2 The expansion of PMC personnel
performing traditional military roles is unprecedented in modern times and
corresponds with U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan." 3 The reason
109 In this case the home state is either the United States or the United Kingdom, so the
suggested limits would apply only when an American or British PMC is providing services on
in another state, on behalf of its home state.
110 Ortiz, supra note 22, at 56.
111 See id. (explaining that one end of the PMC "service spectrum" consists of firms
"offering services that are more commonly undertaken by and/or associated with armed
forces").112 See Thurnher, supra note 46, at 67 (citing Stephen M. Blizzard, Increasing Reliance on
Contractors on the Battlefield: How Do We Keep From Crossing the Line?, 28 A.F. J.
LOGISTICS 1, 6 (2004)) (noting that the United States used contractors primarily for logistical
puroses from the Revolutionary War until Vietnam).
Id. at68.
More significant than the sheer size and cost of the increased use of
contractors is the breadth of assignments being given to these workers. The
United States is tasking its contractors in Iraq in a manner not done in prior
conflicts. The biggest area of change is the reliance on contractors to
perform security functions in an "unstable environment." Contractors are
being used to "protect individuals, buildings and other infrastructure, and
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for keeping PMCs out of the military aspect relates to the reason for using
PMCs in the first place: contracting out logistical tasks allows the military to
focus on its primary task, fighting the war.114 When the purpose of fighting
the war is to help a country develop institutions and a stable government,
then providing security for the agencies that provide these services can be
seen as part of the overall war effort rather than a logistical task that would
not normally be performed by the military.
Beyond the simple observation that the military is best at traditional
combat, there are a variety of reasons for forbidding PMCs from getting
more involved in traditional military roles. First, this approach substantially
reduces the risk of PMCs committing crimes or human rights abuses
generally, simply because personnel are less likely to be placed in a situation
that calls for the use of deadly force. Second, the increased privatization of
war in general, particularly the use of deadly force, has troubling
implications for how modern wars are fought. Specifically, privatization
minimizes and downplays the sacrifices of PMC personnel who die while
working on a government contract.115 Privatization also erodes the idea of
the sovereign possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, making
transport convoys." These companies are performing critical functions that
closely resemble military missions on the battlefield. Even though these
security roles are not of the type that contractors have traditionally
performed, they are now considered "vital" to the operations in Iraq.
Id. (citation omitted).
114 Nelson D. Schwartz & Noshua Watson, The Pentagon's Private Army, FORTUNE, Mar.
17, 2003, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2003/03/17/3
39252/index.htm ("The upshot is that the Pentagon is outsourcing as many tasks as possible to
enable the military.., to focus on its core competency: fighting.").
115 See Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Outsourcing Sacrifice: The Labor of Private Military
Contractors, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 101, 119-20 (2009) (discussing the relationship
between the private military contractor, sacrifice, and American citizenship).
Contractors' deaths are not sacrifices, we might think--contractors are
motivated by private gain, not national service. That is, they did not die so
that the nation might live, but because they chose a dangerous, well-paid line
of employment. They are mercenaries whose deaths do not resonate with a
broader national audience. We need only point out that there is a Tomb of
the Unknown Soldier, none for the Unknown Contractor. Arlington National
Cemetery, that sacred site of the nation's military, also does not provide for
the burial of the contractor as such .... Contractors are not included in
overall troop figures announced by U.S. officials, even though at present in
Iraq they are more or less at parity. Contractor deaths are not included in the
daily body count of soldiers (by one estimate they have been killed at a rate
one quarter that of U.S. soldiers), nor are they given official medals,
pensions, or public honors. (In fact, individual contractors have been given
medals from the United States, including Bronze Stars and Purple Hearts, in
recognition of their service; but the military has said it intends to retract the
medals).
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it difficult to determine how to classify PMC use of force: is the PMC an
extension of the sovereign's monopoly on force, or an independent actor,
challenging the sovereign's traditional monopoly?
Third, privatization of military force may further disengage the civilian
population from the costs of war and give the impression that the cost of the
war effort is born not by American servicemen and women serving in the
military, but by employees of private firms. The employees, whose actions
have little impact on the lives of civilians, are increasingly disconnected
from the life of the average American citizen.
The first argument-that limitation of PMC to non-combat and non-
security roles will reduce the incidence of PMC crimes and human rights
violations-is self-explanatory, but necessarily limited in scope. For
example, the Nisour Square shootings, in which seventeen Iraqis died,
involved Blackwater employees tasked with providing security for a State
Department convoy. 116  The DOJ subsequently indicted five Blackwater
employees for their involvement in the shooting.117 There is no guarantee,
however, that the situation would have turned out differently had the military
been responsible for providing security. In fact, those Blackwater personnel
who are former members of the U.S. military received training similar to that
of the military forces they accompany. The key difference is that, military
personnel, had they been involved in the shootings, would have been
immediately and directly held accountable for their actions through their
chain of command and UCMJ jurisdiction.
The contractors, in contrast, may or may not be held accountable at all.
The DOJ's attempt at holding them accountable has thus far required an
extensive investigation by both the military and the FBI, and prosecution
under the MEJA may not be successful due to the statute's ambiguous
language and scope. 118 The clear advantage of having military personnel
providing security instead of Blackwater is that troops may be reached easily
under UCMJ jurisdiction and would be subject to a court-martial without the
legal wrangling that complicates the Blackwater trials under MEJA
jurisdiction.119 Rather than an extensive, politically divisive, and highly
public investigation involving multiple agencies, the accused could be court-
martialed. The qualities that make a court-martial an attractive method for
administering military justice, namely speed and efficiency, also make it an
ideal way to address abuses of the civilian population. Because a court-
martial can be convened relatively quickly,12° it offers the advantage of
116 Glanz & Rubin, supra note 9.
117 Thompson & Risen, supra note 10.
118 Id.
119 Uniform Code of Military Justice § 802(a).
120 See id. §§ 822-824 (describing how a court martial is convened and who may convene
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expeditious and noticeable results that will immediately register with the
civilian population. This approach is neither unrealistic nor unworkable.
F. Counterargument and Response
Americans who criticize the approach suggested above might argue that it
fails to recognize both the efficiency of using PMCs to provide security
services and the high cost of training troops to provide armed security for
U.S. convoys. Conversely, British critics might focus on the political and
economic costs of establishing a licensing system by legislation. American
critics might also claim that the high costs of using the military to provide
security are not justified since contractors usually do not abuse civilians or
undermine the military's strategy. Critics from either side might also point
out that drawing the line between military and non-military objectives is
inherently difficult. For example, if PMCs can be used for security
functions, then military personnel theoretically have greater freedom to focus
on more important military objectives. Further, most PMC employees are
ex-military and are already trained to perform security related missions,
thereby necessitating no additional training cost for the military. These
increased efficiencies cannot be denied and partly explain why militaries
have come to rely increasingly on PMC security.
Cost concerns are well founded as there is no denying that replacing
security contractors with American troops will require either training more
troops or shifting troops from other missions. These costs, however, will
likely be manageable. Security contractors comprise a relatively small
percentage of all DOD contracts; as of March 2010, security contractors-
the type of contractors most likely to use force-accounted for about twelve
percent of all DOD contractor personnel in Iraq (or 11,610 security
contractors).121 The negative aspect of any additional cost required to train
U.S. troops would be dulled by the continued savings of using the remaining
88% of contractors for non-security roles. Additionally, the government, if it
continues to rely on PMCs for security, must investigate alleged PMC abuses
abroad, which is inherently both difficult and costly because of the logistical
concerns.
As for the argument that PMC abuses are the exception, rather than the
rule, this may be true. The abuses that do occur, however, are deadly and
public enough to justify the costs of investigation. While transferring the
responsibility for security from PMCs to the U.S. military will not directly
prevent abuses, it will ensure accountability through the UCMJ.
one).
121 See SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 1, at 8.
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Continued use of PMCs would have costs that go beyond mere dollar
figures. The strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan relies on
"retain[ing] legitimacy by winning the hearts and minds of local people. 122
If the goal of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is to win the "hearts
and minds" of the local populace, then the U.S. government employing
thousands of private contractors who are not directly accountable to the
military does not further this goal. Revoking contractor immunity in Iraq
was a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. Maintaining a system
that makes it extremely difficult to hold contractors accountable when they
commit abuses makes it more difficult for the United States to claim to be
helping local peoples.
It is also unsatisfactory to claim that change is not necessary because no
additional high profile abuses have occurred since Nisour Square. President
Obama, then a Senator, described the problem well: "We cannot win a fight
for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable
contractors."1
23
While a licensing scheme similar to the U.S. system would certainly be
both politically and economically costly if implemented in the United
Kingdom, the British PMC industry has been successful so far in lobbying
for self-regulation. The glaring cost of self-regulation, however, is that the
United Kingdom has almost no control over what contracts its companies
accept, and will still suffer from bad press every time a British PMC is
accused of wrongdoing. If a Nisour Square-type incident occurs involving a
British PMC, the government may be forced to evaluate the costs and
potentially institute some sort of licensing scheme.
Some may argue for a total ban on PMCs in use of force operations, but
drawing the line between contractors who use force and those who do not
may be more difficult than it seems. Is the best solution to ban contractors
from carrying weapons, or should limitations be based on the type of services
that PMCs provide? Regarding the former, banning contractors from
carrying weapons is not a good way to implement the above
recommendations, since contractors of all types may need to carry weapons
for self-defense in a dangerous environment. Any solution that places
contractors at greater risk than necessary is not a viable one. The solution
122 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 11-12 (2009) ("Local nationals may
not draw a distinction between government contractors and the U.S. military, and the abuses
committed by contractors may strengthen anti-American insurgents, as evidenced by the
public outcry following such incidents.").
123 Christine Hauser, New Rules for Contractors are Urged by 2 Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l0/04/us/politics/04dems.html?_r=l &scp=l&sq=,%20
New%20Rules%20for/o20Contractors%20are%20Urged%20by/o202%20Democrats,&st=cse.
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must also recognize that there will be certain situations where the use of
force by contractors is unavoidable, such as in self-defense.
The better approach is the latter-to limit PMC involvement according to
the type of services provided, specifically security services. Providing armed
security for agency officials and convoys presents the risk that PMC
employees will use force in a setting that would traditionally involve national
militaries. Because PMC personnel must be safe to perform non-security
contracts, they should be able to use force in order to defend themselves
when performing their duties under these contracts. However, this does not
mean that they should be used specifically for a mission that poses a great
risk that force will be used, such as providing armed security. Replacing
PMC security contractors with American troops would increase government
control over the guards' actions and ensure that they are held accountable if
any abuses actually occur. Further, a move away from security services
would not be fatal to the PMC industry. In 2008, Blackwater announced that
it would be shifting its focus to non-security services to avoid placing the
company at further risk.124 Lawsuits from the victims of PMC abuse are just
as likely to cripple the PMC industry as the changes recommended above.
Rather than waiting for the next high profile PMC incident, the United States
can act now to provide its own security-the alternative ignores the lesson of
Blackwater.
Recommending that the United States refuse to use PMCs for security
work is not to suggest that the legal reforms discussed above are not
imperative. Legal reform is by its nature, however, a slow, political process.
By being proactive, the U.S. government can reduce the possibility of PMC
abuses while working to pass legislation that can reach contractors abroad
when abuses inevitably occur.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the United States and United Kingdom begin to exit Iraq and the focus
turns to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, both countries have the
opportunity to learn from mistakes made there in order to avoid repeating
them in Afghanistan. The key to a successful counterinsurgency campaign is
to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. This cannot be accomplished if
Afghans do not truly believe that the United States and United Kingdom are
there to help them. Every effort to reduce the impact of the war on civilians
will increase the legitimacy of the mission and the likelihood of success.
124 Elana Schor, Blackwater to Leave Security Business Following Problems in Iraq,
GUARDIAN (July 22, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/22/usa.iraq.
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If the United States and United Kingdom refuse to use private contractors
to provide armed security for government agencies or diplomats, the
legitimacy of the mission will increase in the eyes of the Afghan people.
Further, in the event abuses do occur, the Afghans must see that those
responsible are brought to justice. Experience in Iraq has shown that the
legal uncertainties surrounding contractors frustrate efforts to bring justice to
those who commit abuses. Replacing security contractors with military
personnel will not ensure that such abuses will not occur or even reduce their
likelihood, but it does ensure that if service members are accused of a crime,
they can be held accountable under the UCMJ. The economic cost of this
approach is higher than using PMCs, but it will also show the Afghan people
that the United States values their lives and places a premium on justice and
the rule of law.
This approach will not solve all of the problems associated with PMCs.
The United States can and should continue to use PMCs for non-security
services, and these contractors will need protection. However, due to the
staggering number of contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would not be
feasible or even desirable for the United States or British militaries to
provide all of the security for all contractors in their countries. For this
reason, contractors must be permitted to provide their own security.
Because armed contractors will continue to operate within Iraq and
Afghanistan, the United States and the United Kingdom must adopt a
strategy of regulatory reform. In the United States, this will take the form of
continued licensing of all U.S. contractors, along with clear and powerful
legislation that will allow the United States to exercise jurisdiction over PMC
activities abroad. The United States must also give the Afghan and Iraqi
governments a greater stake in the decision-making process and be more
reluctant to grant PMCs immunity from local law in the future. When cases
reach U.S. courts, the Department of Justice must be more diligent in
prosecuting cases in order to ensure that cases proceed and that the
defendants receive a fair trial.
In the United Kingdom, the regulatory strategy requires a licensing
system. Because the United Kingdom has yet to experience a PMC incident
on the scale of Nisour Square, the political will to regulate PMCs has yet to
materialize despite pressure from NGOs. Rather than waiting for an incident
that will reveal the inadequacies of self-regulation, the British government
should establish a regulatory system based on the U.S. licensing scheme.
Nisour Square has shown how a single incident can threaten the
legitimacy of both the entire mission in Iraq, as well as the whole PMC
industry. Iraqi bitterness over the attack will likely linger for years, and
Blackwater has had to substantially alter its business model because of the
resulting scrutiny of its activities abroad. Regardless of these events, the
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United States and United Kingdom continue to rely on security contractors to
protect their government agencies. With the promise of a new strategy and
greater American resolve, Afghanistan offers a chance to change course.
